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This paper reviews the claim that economic policymakers in the post-Covid UK should learn the lessons 
of the 1940s.  Post-1945 policies relating to delivering full employment, levelling up, upgrading social 
security, dealing with the public debt legacy, and addressing the productivity puzzle are considered.  
The paper finds many reasons to criticize 1940s’ policies.  Although, superficially, outcomes appear to 
have been good, a closer look reveals significant failings notably concerning design of the welfare state 
and supply-side policy for growth.  The main lesson from the 1940s is not to repeat the policy errors 
of those days. 
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The transition from war to peace in the years after 1945 is often regarded as a great British success 
story.  The economy is seen to have moved rapidly to a golden age of inclusive economic growth as 
well as establishing a welfare state that provided economic security ‘from the cradle to the grave’.   
The unemployment of the 1930s was eliminated while inflation remained under control. 
There is still a great deal of nostalgia for the policy reforms of early post-war Britain.  In a flagship 
speech called A New Chapter for Britain (2021), the Labour Party leader Sir Keir Starmer hailed the 
determination of those years to pursue fundamental reform and argued that there is now a similar 
mood to that prevailing in 1945 to build a better, more secure future.  It is routine for commentators 
to call for ‘a new Beveridge Plan’ or slightly more circumspectly to argue that ‘a good start for a post-
pandemic society would be to learn the lessons of the 1940s’ (Lansley, 2021). 
If so, it is important to take away the right messages rather than look at the episode through rose-
tinted glasses as is so often the case.  In this paper, I review economic policy reforms implemented by 
Labour after World War II, and largely continued by the Conservatives subsequently, which relate to 
issues of importance to Britain in ‘building back better’ post-Covid.  These include delivering full 
employment, levelling up, upgrading social security, dealing with the public debt legacy, and 
addressing the productivity puzzle. 
I shall argue that, although the results of the post-war settlement may look good at first sight, in many 
respects, early post-war economic policy reforms were not well designed, and they should be 
regarded quite sceptically even recognising the difficult context for policymaking in the late 1940s.  
Notice should be taken of two aspects of that context, namely the imperative of dealing with the 
macroeconomic situation and the commitment to a post-war settlement that ruled out a return to the 
1930s. 
At the end of the war, the UK confronted not only a huge public debt to GDP ratio but also a large 
monetary overhang which was the result of repressed inflation during the war (Eichengreen 1993) and 
a serious balance of payments deficit on current account (Cairncross 1985).  Marshall aid was almost 
entirely used to reduce government debt (Mayer, 1969).  Priority was given to an export drive with 
imports and consumption held back by controls (Dow, 1964).  In 1951, while real GDP was 23.4 per 
cent above the 1938 level and exports were 42.2 per cent higher, consumer expenditure and imports 
were only 3.6 per cent above and 0.7 per cent below their 1938 levels, respectively (Feinstein, 1972). 
The ‘road to 1945’ meant that there would be a post-war settlement was based on the ideas of 
Beveridge and Keynes regarding the welfare state and maintenance of full employment (Addison, 
1975).  The state would provide security ‘from the cradle to the grave’ in a more equal society.  The 
introduction of the National Health Service in 1948 was widely celebrated (Lowe, 2005).  At the time 
it was believed that poverty could be eliminated. 
Central to this new dawn was the end of the mass unemployment which had scarred the interwar 
period.  The 1944 White Paper pledged that the maintenance of a high and stable level of employment 
was a primary aim and responsibility of government.  It soon became conventional wisdom that this 
was a sine qua non for a government to be re-elected. The influential analysis of opinion poll data by 
Goodhart and Bhansali (1970) gives substance to this belief.  They found that unemployment greater 
than 400,000 (about 1.8% of the labour force) implied that the governing party had no chance of 
leading in the polls; clearly, presiding over a return to interwar levels of unemployment (never less 
than 1.8 million) would be electoral suicide. 
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Economic outcomes in the early post-war period were on the face of it very good and this has enabled 
the Attlee governments to get a good press.  Macroeconomic performance in the long post-war boom 
seemed to be outstanding and certainly much better than could have been hoped for at the end of 
the war.  The economic environment was much less hostile than the 1930s’ experience of depression 
and trade wars.  Western Europe had the opportunity for rapid growth through reducing the 
productivity gap with the United States and recovering from the shocks of depression and war.  As can 
be seen in Table 1, this was a time of rapid productivity growth, low unemployment, and tolerable 
inflation. 
At the same time, living standards improved steadily, as is reported in Table 2.  Real GDP per person 
(and real wages) nearly doubled in this ‘Golden Age’ while by 1973 life expectancy had exceeded the 
maximum thought in the 1930s to be attainable and hours of work were about 25 per cent lower than 
in the 1930s.  By the late 1950s, the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, had coined the slogan, ‘You’ve 
never had it so good!’.  The high point for happiness in the period after World War II was in 1957, the 
year of Macmillan’s famous speech.1 
The expansion of the welfare state was accompanied by a rapid reduction in the ratio of public debt 
to GDP, as is recorded in Table 3.  Fiscal sustainability was not an issue despite the expansion of the 
welfare state at a time when government debt had ballooned through wartime borrowing.2  This was, 
of course, helped by the low unemployment and strong economic growth of the period.  A decline in 
the public debt ratio was also propelled by very low real interest rates which were generally well below 
the rate of growth. 
Clearly, there was considerable progress in the early post-war decades but, nevertheless, a closer look 
at the outcomes of the post-war settlement reveals a less rosy picture than is often painted.3   In the 
next section, I examine in some detail how successful key policy reforms involved in reconstructing 
the post-war UK economy really were with a view to looking in the following section at lessons for 
post-Covid policymaking. 
 
2. Post-War Economic Policy Reforms Revisited 
 
The Attlee governments are generally recognised to have carried out far-reaching economic reforms 
which were fundamental for the reconstruction of the UK economy after the war and set the scene 
for the next two decades.  These are years which are often described as the period of ‘post-war 
consensus’.  This concept should be understood as the set of policies regarded as feasible by senior 
politicians and civil servants given presumed political constraints (Kavanagh and Morris, 1994).  This 
implied a high degree of policy convergence but did not connote ideological convergence between 
the Conservative and Labour parties (Hickson, 2004).  Certainly, it is fair to say that when the 
Conservatives returned to office in 1951 they did not try to dismantle the framework that Labour had 
constructed.  So, it is appropriate to consider the medium-term impact of the policies adopted in the 
late 1940s. 
Full employment 
In the aftermath of the interwar experience of high, and in many areas persistent, unemployment, the 
post-war consensus implied a very strong commitment to maintaining full employment.  In the famous 
 
1 As measured by the valence of words in books; see Sgroi et al. (2017). 
2 Public debt as a percentage of GDP peaked in 1947 at 240.7 (Middleton, 1996). 
3 For example, by Hennessy (1993) in his well-known book: ‘progress on a scale and a duration never surpassed 
in the nation’s history’. 
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1944 White Paper the government made a commitment to ‘the maintenance of a high and stable level 
of employment’ (BPP, 1944).  This was achieved – there was no serious recession and the average 
level of unemployment was a long way below that of the 1930s.  Although this was a period when 
Keynesian macroeconomics was in the ascendancy, Keynesian demand management was not the 
reason for this success.  As Matthews (1968) pointed out a long time ago, aggregate demand was 
sustained by a macroeconomic environment conducive to investment and exports rather than by 
deficit finance.  And in an era of ‘stop-go’, attempts at fine-tuning demand did not make any great 
contribution through stabilizing demand growth (Hatton and Chrystal, 1991). 
The striking feature of the period was the low NAIRU which has been estimated at 2% in the 1950s 
and 1960s compared with 9.8% in the 1930s (Hatton and Boyer, 2005). This is paradoxical because the 
prediction of a standard wage and price setting model is that NAIRU in the 1950s would have been 
much higher than in the 1930s (Broadberry, 1994).  One important, albeit disputed, reason for this 
may be the post-war settlement and the ‘social contract’ between government and organised labour 
that it entailed. 
Whether or not this was the reason for the low NAIRU of the 1950s, government clearly tried to 
engineer this outcome, recognising that keeping unemployment at the level the electorate seemed to 
demand without igniting inflation was problematic.4  This was addressed by an implicit social contract 
between governments and organized labour which sought to deliver wage restraint in return for 
supply-side policies designed to please trade unions (Flanagan et al., 1983).  This meant the 
persistence of weak competition policies, high marginal tax rates, state-owned enterprise, 
protectionism, and dysfunctional industrial relations.  In other words, the pursuit of low 
unemployment came at quite a high cost in terms of impairing productivity growth. 
Levelling up 
When Labour took office in 1945 ‘levelling up’ was an important objective.  The 1930s had been a 
period of persistent unemployment in many regions outside the relatively prosperous South and 
Midlands.  Ending relatively high regional unemployment was a key aspect of achieving the promised 
goal of full employment.  The years 1945 to 1947 put in place a strong regional policy initiative based 
on Development Areas which covered 17.8% of the population and which benefited from government-
financed factory development and financial assistance to firms. 51.3% of new industrial building 
approvals in these years were in these development areas (Scott, 1997).  In 1947, this approach was 
supplemented by the introduction of Industrial Development Certificates which were required for 
premises greater than 5,000 square feet and which could be used to control industrial location 
decisions. 
As is reported in Table 4, relative to the interwar years, the early post-war period saw greatly reduced 
regional unemployment levels; for example, in 1951, unemployment in Wales was 2.7% compared 
with 24.8% in 1938.  Estimates of regional GDP/person were not available at the time but it is now 
apparent that shortfalls below the average for Great Britain were generally much lower in the 1950s 
than in the 1930s, as is also shown in Table 4. 
 
4 Already in the late 1930s and early 1940s, Keynesian economists (notably James Meade) worried about the 
inflationary consequences of using demand management to reduce unemployment to very low levels since 
this would imply wage-push inflation.  Some kind of ‘wages policy’ would be required to deal with this issue 
(Jones, 1987).  In other words, these economists were aware that Keynesian policies would probably entail 
trying to deliver unemployment rates below the NAIRU. 
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The levelling up reported in Table 4 was promoted by a more favourite economic environment and 
the location controls adopted during the war and its immediate aftermath.  The deglobalizing trade 
wars of the 1930s gave way to the world trade boom of the 1950s which revived the fortunes of the 
export industries and, no doubt, improved the matching efficiency of the labour market which had 
deteriorated markedly during the late 1920s and early 1930s (Luzardo-Luna, 2020).  141,000 jobs 
survived in 1960 from industrial moves made between 1937 and 1944 and 228,000 jobs survived in 
1966 from moves made between 1945 and 1951, in each case mostly in ‘outer Britain’ (Law, 1980). 
Nevertheless, this post-war regional policy had a short duration and had very limited ambitions with 
the result that its long-term impact was underwhelming.  During the late 1940s, balance-of-payments 
considerations dominated the issue of IDCs.  Regional policy spending fell sharply in the late 1940s 
and by the early 1950s regional policy was largely in abeyance (Moore and Rhodes, 1973).  At the time, 
it seemed to many policymakers that the regional problem had gone away.  In any event, development 
area policies focused on short-term employment creation rather than having a basis in an industrial 
strategy or seeking to improve productivity (Scott, 1997). 
Upgrading social security 
The best known of all the 1940s’ policy reform proposals were those of the Beveridge Report 
(Beveridge, 1942).  This promised to guarantee ‘freedom from want’, i.e., to provide economic 
security, through ‘social insurance’.5    This is described as ‘first and foremost, a plan of insurance – of 
giving in return for contributions benefits up to subsistence level, as of right and without means test’ 
(p.7).  If required, national assistance subject to a uniform means test would be a safety net for a 
limited number of cases which the scheme did not cover.   
The framework was built on a number of ‘fundamental principles’ which included a flat rate of 
subsistence benefit, a flat rate of contribution, and adequacy of benefit.  The chief means of providing 
income support was to be universal contingency benefits with the main categories being old-age 
pensions, sickness benefit and unemployment benefit.  These would be financed by a combination of 
national insurance contributions (69%) and general taxation (31%).  These proposals were largely 
implemented by 1948 with three important exceptions.  First, there was no waiting period to build up 
contributions before a full pension was paid at retirement age.  Second, benefits were continually 
updated to roughly keep pace with increases in wages.  Third, the benefit levels payable at the outset 
were distinctly lower than the late 1930s’ poverty lines adopted by Beveridge and Rowntree (Dilnot 
et al., 1984).  An implication was that, instead of withering away, claimants of means-tested National 
Assistance increased over time reaching 2 million in the mid-1960s. 
Contrary to Rowntree’s original findings, a significant amount of poverty was still present in the early 
years after World War II after the implementation of the welfare state reforms.  A recent analysis of 
the 1953/4 Family Expenditure Survey found that 7.1 per cent of all households were below the 
National Assistance level of income, 9.8 per cent were below 140 per cent of National Assistance 
income and 13.2 per cent were below 60 per cent of median equivalized income (Gazeley et al., 2017).  
No comparable estimate has been made for the interwar period but extrapolating from the post-war 
period a guesstimate is that about 16 per cent of the population may have been below 60 per cent of 
median income in 1937.6 Hatton and Bailey (2000) calculated that the true figure for York on 
Rowntree’s own criterion was 11.8 per cent of working-class households or 7.1 per cent of all 
 
5 The report also proposed the establishment of a national health service funded very largely out of general 
taxation but the analysis of this section of the paper only deals with the income-support aspects. 
6 For the period 1961 to 2015, McKnight et al. (2017) estimated this measure of poverty = -0.0496 + 
0.7261Gini.  If Gini in 1937 = 0.29 (see Table 6), then this equation would predict poverty = 16.1 per cent. 
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households in poverty.7  They also calculated the proportion which would have been in poverty had 
the reforms not been introduced (Table 5).  They estimate that if the 1936 social security system had 
still been in place in 1950, the percentage of working-class households in poverty would have risen to 
15.5 and that if food subsidies had also been taken away 21.2 per cent would have fallen below the 
poverty line.8  Thus, even if food subsidies are included, the total impact of welfare reform on working-
class poverty was 9.4 percentage points rather than the 20.1 percentage points claimed by Rowntree 
and Lavers (1951).  Cartter (1955) estimated that net redistribution was 13.1 per cent of national 
income in 1948/9 compared with 8.8 per cent in 1937. 
In sum, the 1940s’ reforms reduced poverty but their impact was neither trivial nor transformative.  
However, the promises of the Beveridge Report were not delivered.  This outcome was inherent in its 
seriously flawed design. 
Beveridge stressed repeatedly that ‘social insurance’ was the core of his scheme and this informed 
the Beveridge principles of flat-rate benefits and contributions.  He emphasized that his proposal 
delivered benefits in return for contributions.  Flat-rate contributions constrained re-distribution 
partly because they were a regressive tax but also because they limited the scope to pay generous 
benefits.  Compulsory national insurance was justified as a way of pooling risks and, in effect, 
addressing adverse selection problems that implied market failure.  More generally, however, the 
concept of social insurance might be conceived as a way of protecting the individual against economic 
risks against which private insurance is infeasible such as inflation or unemployment or loss from 
unforeseen events, e.g., coronavirus.  These aspects do not imply that the provisions equate to 
actuarial insurance where the premia cover expected loss plus a normal profit for the insurer (Barr, 
2012) and they entail benefits based on current need rather than past contributions.   
Beveridge’s scheme was deliberately very limited in its redistributive component because it was 
constructed to deviate as little as possible from actuarial insurance.  The prime example of this can be 
seen in the proposal of a lengthy transition period to qualify for a full retirement pension.  Not only 
did Beveridge-style pensions eschew redistribution but they did not provide adequate insurance; 
pensioners would have suffered severely from the unanticipated inflation of the 1970s against which 
they were much better protected by a PAYG scheme. 
The social security system developed in the light of the Beveridge Report relied heavily on contingency 
benefits as opposed to means-tested benefits.  This reduced adverse incentive effects from high 
effective marginal tax rates but at the same time implied that a high proportion of expenditure on 
benefits was not well targeted.  Beckerman and Clark (1982) estimated the social security system 
removed 84.3 per cent of the pre-benefit poverty gap in 1961-3 but that only 27 per cent of spending 
contributed to reducing the poverty gap.  In the end, this meant that achieving adequacy of national 
insurance benefits was too expensive.9   
Finally, it should be noted that the Beveridge Scheme (and its costings) make no sense if poverty is 
defined on a relative income basis, e.g., 60% median income.  Then, economic growth implies that 
benefits must rise over time regardless of contributions or poverty will intensify. 
Dealing with the debt 
 
7 Rowntree’s third survey reported that 4.8 per cent of working-class households (implying about 2.8 per cent 
of all households) were in poverty in 1950 (Rowntree and Lavers, 1951). 
8 Food subsidies were not part of the Beveridge scheme but a ‘leftover’ from World War II. 
9 See the discussions of ‘back to Beveridge’ in Atkinson (1969) and IFS (1978). 
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The public debt to GDP ratio can be reduced either by running primary budget surpluses and/or 
through experiencing a period when the real interest rate on government debt (r) is lower than the 
growth rate of GDP (g).  The latter may be achieved by financial repression.  A policy of ‘financial 
repression’ can be defined as one in which government intervention reduces the nominal interest rate 
on public debt below the free market rate.  Combined with inflation, this will be conducive to a more 
favourable configuration of (r – g) and may well entail a negative real interest rate on government 
borrowing.10   
It is well-known that the steady-state condition for the public debt to GDP ratio (d) to be stabilized, 
such that Δd = 0, is 
b* = d(i - π – g) or b* = d(r – g)                                                                                                                  
where b* is the required primary budget surplus to GDP ratio, i is the nominal interest rate on 
government debt, π is the rate of inflation and g is the growth rate of real GDP.  The required primary 
budget surplus increases with the debt to GDP ratio and with (r – g).  Of course, if r < g, it is possible 
to stabilize the debt ratio while running a primary budget deficit. 
The 1950s and 1960s witnessed a very rapid reduction of the public debt to GDP ratio.  From almost 
200 per cent of GDP in 1950 it was below the Maastricht limit by 1971 when it had fallen to 58.3 per 
cent of GDP.  These two decades were characterized by primary budget surpluses in every year but 
they averaged only 2.3 per cent of GDP.  The average rate of inflation was about 4 per cent per year 
and in eight years the ex-post real interest rate on government debt was negative; real interest rates 
were almost always below the real growth rate.  Growth was strong by British standards but, even so, 
the striking feature of this period is the very low level of real interest rates; the average over the whole 
20 years is only slightly positive (Table 6).  An accounting decomposition of the reduction in the debt 
ratio shows that 54% came from (r – g) and 36% from budget surpluses (Crafts, 2016).11   
The rapid debt reduction of these years was achieved together with an expansion of the welfare state 
but without many years of very painful fiscal consolidation.  This could be done because it was possible 
to address the issue through financial repression.   Allen (2014) provides a detailed account of the way 
that this was achieved which included making banks have high levels of liquid assets to deposits which 
could be met by holding Treasury Bills, controls on interest rates, credit restrictions for private sector 
lending, and comprehensive foreign exchange controls.  In the 1950s, over 40 per cent of the public 
debt was held by domestic commercial banks and over 40 per cent was non-marketable (Abbas et al., 
2014).   The financial repression index score calculated by Battilossi (2004) was as high as 73.1 in 1953-
7 and still 63.1 in 1963-7. 12 Politically, financial repression fitted with an era of very high top marginal 
income tax rates in a rather egalitarian climate and a strong preference for tight regulation of the 
financial system following the banking crises of the interwar period. 
The context under the Bretton Woods system was also a different macroeconomic policy trilemma 
choice, namely, a fixed exchange rate, independent monetary policy, and obstacles to capital mobility 
as foreign exchange controls were maintained from World War II until 1979.  The UK had low scores 
 
10 It should be noted that the ex-ante implication of financial repression on r is distinct from that of surprise 
inflation which is a different (possibly complementary) strategy for manipulating the ex-post real interest rate, 
cf. equation 6 in Reinhart and Sbrancia (2015). 
11 The formula is that of Abbas et al. (2011) which includes a residual component.  This amounts to 10% of the 
decline in the debt ratio. 
12 The index has 3 equally weighted components, namely, reserve requirements for banks, real deposit rates of 
banks and government liabilities held by the banking system.  Each of these is measured on a scale of 0 
(minimum) to 100 (maximum) standardized to a normal distribution. 
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both for central bank independence (Cukierman et al., 1992) and for capital account openness (Quinn 
and Toyoda, 2008).  The evidence presented to the Radcliffe Committee underlined that the 
Chancellor not the Bank had responsibility for interest rate policy while debt management and 
controlling the interest costs of the national debt were central tasks for the Bank throughout these 
decades (Goodhart, 2012).  Interest rates were decoupled from those prevailing abroad (Obstfeld, 
1993).  There was relatively little surprise inflation (Reinhart and Sbrancia, 2015); nominal interest 
rates rose but, even so, were held down relative to inflation.   
Improving productivity performance 
The post-war settlement set the scene for the UK’s growth performance in the ‘Golden Age’ of 
European economic growth which is conventionally located in the years 1950 to 1973.  In Table 1, it 
was reported that labour productivity growth was 3.74% per year in this period, a rate which is 
comfortably the fastest ever for the UK.13 
Placed in a comparative international context, however, UK productivity growth in the Golden Age 
was disappointing and was notably inferior to that of France and West Germany, as is reported in 
Table 7.  Although these countries had more scope for rapid catch-up growth starting from lower 
productivity levels, the key point to note is that they had overtaken the UK by 1973 when their labour 
productivity levels were about 12 per cent higher.  UK underperformance relative to the diagnostic 
prediction of an unconditional convergence regression has been estimated at 0.8 per cent per year 
(Crafts and Toniolo, 2008).  This was a missed opportunity for which UK supply-side policy conceived 
in the 1940s was largely responsible. 
That said, this shortfall should not be attributed to excessive expenditure on the welfare state, as was 
claimed by Barnett (1986).  In 1949, UK social security spending was estimated by ILO (1953) as just 
above the median level for western European countries and appreciably below that of France or West 
Germany.  Rather than blame the extent of the welfare state per se, an alternative might be to claim 
that it was funded by distortionary taxation, especially high marginal tax rates on corporate income 
which growth economics might emphasize.  Here the important point to note is that depreciation 
allowances, introduced by the Labour government in 1945 and subsequently retained although 
continually modified, meant that effective marginal tax rates were not exceptionally high by the 
standards of the time.  King and Fullerton (1984) estimate an average marginal rate across all assets 
of about 40% in 1960 compared with 50% in West Germany and 45% in the United States.14 
The post-war settlement did have a serious cost in terms of foregone productivity growth this was 
incurred through the supply-side policies that it entailed, especially in the context of a looming balance 
of payments problem.  The implicit ‘social contract’ entailed persuading organised labour to accept 
and encourage wage restraint in return for welfarism, expanded public ownership, unreformed 
industrial relations and commitments to full employment and significant re-distribution of income 
(Flanagan et al., 1983).  The priority given to increasing exports and controlling imports ensured that 





13 It should be noted that this estimate has been revised upwards following recent updates to the UK national 
accounts, see Crafts (2021). 
14 The exact rates vary somewhat depending on the rate of inflation. 
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A flagship policy of the Attlee government was the nationalization of a substantial component of the 
UK economy including public utilities and transport during the late 1940s.  This meant that a sizeable 
fraction of investment would be undertaken by the state rather than the private sector.  In a typical 
post-war year (1971), the nationalized industries accounted for 18.7 per cent of investment, 7.2 per 
cent of employment and 10.2 per cent of GDP (Corti, 1976) so their productivity performance 
mattered and indeed a major justification for nationalization was that it would improve efficiency. 
Principal-agent problems were, however, seriously underestimated and not adequately addressed 
until the late 1970s when a combination of external financing limits, cost targets, profit targets and 
investigations by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission was imposed.  In the 1950s, by contrast, 
industry boards were supposed to act in the ‘public interest’ and break even taking one year with 
another.  Financial targets were imposed in the 1960s but effectively abandoned in the 1970s.  Political 
interference was a continual problem.  If we suppose that there were information asymmetries, and 
that managers liked more output but disliked effort to reduce costs (Bishop and Thompson, 1992), it 
is not surprising that productivity performance in the 1950s and 1970s was very disappointing (see 
Table 7).  Both inefficient use of labour and excessive investment were serious problems (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988). 
For the first decade after the war the priority given to addressing balance of payments problems 
meant that import controls were relaxed very slowly and that the cooperation of trade associations 
was seen as crucial for the export drive.  The implication was that the cartels which had proliferated 
since the 1930s were sustained with their market power enhanced.  It was thought unwise to 
antagonize business interests by pursuing an effective competition policy, so proposals worked up at 
the Board of Trade during the war were dropped (Mercer, 1995).  Average tariffs remained at mid-
1930s levels and trade costs only fell very belatedly (Table 9).  Failure to liberalize trade underpinned 
market power as reflected by high price-cost margins (Hitiris, 1978).  The weakness of import 
competition had a strong negative effect on manufacturing productivity growth (Bos, 2015).  The trade 
to GDP ratio which had been 51.5% GDP in 1929 before the UK turned protectionist was only 40.3% 
GDP in 1960 (Thomas and Dimsdale, 2017, Tables A9 and A36).15 
Competition policy was indeed largely ineffective, politicized, and embodied an ill-defined ‘public-
interest’ criterion for intervention (Clarke et al., 1998).  Only the Restrictive Practices Act (1956) had 
teeth.  Not surprisingly, there is evidence that the British economy was characterized by substantial 
market power in this period.  Initially, collusive activity was widespread; an examination of the 
agreements registered in compliance with the 1956 Act shows that only 27 per cent of manufacturing 
was free of price-fixing and 35.7 per cent was cartelized (Broadberry and Crafts, 1996).  Crafts and 
Mills (2005) estimated that the price-cost margin in UK manufacturing during 1954-73 averaged over 
2 compared with around 1.1 in West Germany which is consistent with the finding in Geroski and 
Jacquemin (1988) that the magnitude and persistence of supernormal profits for large firms during 
1949 to 1977 was large in the UK but not in West Germany. 
The evidence is that weak competition had an adverse effect on UK productivity performance during 
the Golden Age.  Broadberry and Crafts (1996) found that cartelization was strongly negatively related 
to productivity growth in a cross section of manufacturing industries for 1954-63.  This result is borne 
out by the difference-in-differences analysis in Symeonidis (2008) who showed that when cartels were 
 
15 This was likely to have reduced real GDP/person considerably.  Had the 1929 trade ratio been maintained a 
calculation along the lines of Feyrer (2019) using a lower-bound elasticity of 0.5 implies that the level of GDP 
would have been about 10.9% higher in 1960.  This calculation is similar in spirit to recent attempts to look at 
the long-run impact of Brexit. 
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abandoned following the 1956 Restrictive Practices Act labour productivity growth in formerly 
colluding sectors rose by 1.8 percentage points per year in 1964-73 compared with 1954-63.  This 
finding implies that a well-designed competition policy would have improved productivity outcomes. 
 
Case studies strongly implicate bad management and restrictive labour practices resulting from 
bargaining with unions in poor productivity performance. This configuration was enabled by weak 
competition.16  Pratten and Atkinson (1976) reviewed 25 studies of which 23 reported inefficient use 
of labour, in 21 cases from failings of management and in 14 instances from restrictive labour 
practices.  Prais (1981) reported similar findings in 8 out of 10 industry case studies and in each case 
noted that competition was significantly impaired.  Business respondents to an Oxford survey in the 
late 1940s thought that inefficient use of labour and industrial relations problems were prevalent 
(Andrews and Brunner, 1950).  A strong theme in several studies which highlight low effort bargains 
is that they were sustained by the weakness of competition; for example, this emerges clearly in the 
study by Zweig (1951) as well as the seminal work in industrial sociology on restrictive labour practices 
(Lupton, 1963). 
 
Britain had a distinctive and unreformed system of industrial relations characterized by craft control, 
multi-unionism, legal immunities for trade unions, and strong but decentralized collective bargaining 
reflected in increasing trade union membership and the proliferation of shop stewards (Crouch, 1993).  
These arrangements in conditions of full employment and weak competition gave trade unions 
bargaining power and rents to extract while exposing sunk-costs investment to a ‘hold-up’ problem.17  
In the context of the post-war settlement, the government maintained an approach of ‘voluntarism’ 
in which industrial relations problems were to be resolved by bargaining between employers and 
unions with minimal regulation.  This precluded much needed reform of industrial training, especially 
the apprenticeship system (Pemberton, 2001).  This was seen by critics as unduly lengthy but not 
delivering high quality training as well as perpetuating restrictive practices, but trade unions saw it as 
supporting wage premia and employers benefited from cheap labour (Gospel, 1995). 
3. A Blueprint for Post-Covid UK? 
So, should we turn to the 1940s as a template for the post-pandemic UK to address the five policy 
issues listed in the introduction?  In some cases, there is nothing of relevance, in others the main 
message is not to repeat costly errors but then there are aspects where the ideas are valuable, 
although the details would be different seventy-five years later. 
A whole new ball game 
Policymakers keen to ensure that the post-Covid economy is not scarred by unemployment or looking 
for interventions that promote levelling up will find that there is little or nothing of value in the 
approach of the early post-war years.  Times are different and ideas have moved on. 
 
16 This was clearly revealed when competition strengthened in the 1980s giving rise to major changes in 
industrial relations and management structures that raised productivity significantly (Machin and Wadhwani, 
1989; Harris et al., 2005). 
17 The ‘hold-up’ problem arises when after an investment has been made workers use their bargaining power 
to extract a share of the profits.  This reduces the incentive to innovate and thus the rate of growth.  The more 
unions are involved in the bargaining, the more profits are reduced.   The problem can be eliminated if a 
binding contract prevents renegotiation or there is no union or if a cooperative equilibrium is achieved with a 
single union.  For a formal model and empirical evidence, see Bean and Crafts (1996). 
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The policy approach aimed at keeping NAIRU low in the aftermath of World War II was based on 
achieving ‘wage restraint’ in the context of voluntaristic industrial relations and strong trade unions.  
This entailed accepting that various aspects of supply-side policy were ‘no-go’ areas.  This episode is 
not helpful in formulating policy today when industrial relations are very different and the institutions 
and policy settings of the pre-Covid economy were consistent with an equilibrium unemployment rate 
of about 4.5% (OBR, 2018).  The post-Covid economy may well go through a difficult transitional phase 
as the composition of employment adjusts and this may require improved active labour market policy 
with better training (Mayhew and Anand, 2020) and job-search assistance (Costa Dias et al., 2020).  
However, the 1940s and 1950s do not offer any help in designing such initiatives. 
Levelling up 1940s’ style relied on crude policy interventions which focused on short-term 
employment creation rather than improving productivity and modernizing industrial structure with 
long-term economic growth in mind (Scott, 1997).  It is not completely clear what ‘levelling up’ entails 
but a sustained advance in economic performance in ‘left-behind’ areas surely requires improved 
labour productivity.  The thoughtful analysis of how to devise a successful local industrial strategy in 
Zymek and Jones (2020) identifies various deep roots of spatial productivity differences and the 
possible problems arising from them which may need to be addressed.  This is a promising approach 
which would not be improved by looking for policy ideas from the early post-war period. 
No worries 
Starting from basic ideas, ‘social insurance’ would entail provision of public insurance against risks of 
serious loss of income or wealth for which private insurance is infeasible.  This will be the case where 
risks are correlated across the population, expected costs cannot be estimated, or contingencies 
cannot be foreseen.  Income losses during the Covid-19 pandemic and wealth losses from paying for 
social care are classic examples.18  The Beveridge-style welfare state addressed neither of these issues.  
Its concept of social insurance was not one of maintenance of income and wealth in the face of adverse 
shocks but avoidance of poverty.  A flat rate of benefit to prevent poverty falls well short of the 
insurance that most people would be willing to pay for if it was available and a component of earnings-
related benefits must be part of a welfare state that provides insurance against income loss. 
The impact of Covid-19 was addressed through ad hoc income maintenance schemes, notably, the 
Corona Virus Job Retention (furlough) Scheme and the Self-Employed Income Support Scheme.  This 
was a clear admission that the low-level payments available through Universal Credit are not an 
adequate form of social insurance.  Unfortunately, there were holes in the safety net for the self-
employed which meant that about 1.5 million people were excluded (Cribb et al., 2021) and a 
significant proportion experienced financial hardship (Blundell et al., 2021).  If we now face a class of 
newly salient risks including further pandemics, climate-change related losses and cyberattacks where 
private insurance is not feasible (Aaron, 2020), social insurance is more relevant than ever, but it must 
be taken seriously by policymakers who, unlike Beveridge, embrace the concept fully. 
Opportunity knocks 
After World War II the post-war settlement dictated that there should no return to the 1930s.  More 
than anything else, this meant that there should be no going back to the high unemployment of that 
decade.  The equivalent in post-Covid Britain is that, even though the public debt to GDP ratio has 
topped 100 per cent of GDP, there should be no more ‘austerity’, i.e., fiscal consolidation based on 
 
18 The Report of the Dilnot Commission (2011) sets out very clearly the reasons why the market does not offer 




expenditure cuts.  This is understandable given the severity and duration of reductions in public 
spending after the financial crisis (Crafts, 2020). 
The situation faced by the UK has similarities to the years after World War II in that there are urgent 
demands for more government spending (including more generous transfer payments) to address 
issues of fairness as well as improving public services and rectifying a large backlog in infrastructure 
investment while confronting the issue of ensuring fiscal sustainability by stabilizing and then reducing 
the public debt to GDP ratio.  Clearly, increases in taxation will play an important part but the lesson 
from the experience of the UK in the 1950s and 1960s is that the interest rate growth rate differential 
is a key variable.  Negative values for (r – g) in those years made the combination of welfare state 
expansion and debt ratio reduction eminently feasible.  Financial repression and golden age growth 
made for pleasant fiscal arithmetic.  OBR (2020) envisages a medium-term scenario where (r – g) = 0.2 
percent but pointed out that this was by no means guaranteed. 
So, keeping the real interest rate on government debt down and improving productivity growth after 
its unprecedented pre- Covid slowdown (Crafts and Mills, 2020) have high priority as the foundation 
of a new fiscal settlement.  It is not possible to replicate the 1950s – capital controls and golden age 
catch-up growth are the past not the future.  It may, however, be possible to use an alternative 
method of financial repression.  
The route to a modern version of financial repression lies through exploiting the opportunity provided 
by quantitative easing which means that nearly £900 billion of government debt has been bought by 
the Bank of England and is financed at the Bank Rate (currently 0.1%) paid on commercial bank 
reserves.  A substantial part of these reserves could be frozen with no interest paid, although some 
fraction would have to continue to pay interest to make monetary policy effective.  Alternatively, they 
could be compulsorily swapped for short and medium-term gilt-edged securities (Allen, 2021).  
Either of these methods is in effect a tax on banks and in economic policy terms the issue is whether 
any adverse side effects of such a tax outweigh its public finance benefits.  Politically, however, it is 
hard to think of a more popular way to approach a new fiscal settlement, especially with the ‘red-wall 
voters’ who matter so much to the government’s chances of winning the next election.  Excessive risk-
taking by banks which precipitated the financial crisis has imposed substantial fiscal costs on the UK 
economy.  Freezing bank reserves might go some way towards a fairer contribution to making 
recompense as well as to some extent insulating (r – g) from the impact of interest rate rises as the 
economy returns to ‘normal’.19 
Not on your nelly 
Policy reforms that can improve the UK’s productivity performance are a high priority given the very 
disappointing experience since the financial crisis.  In this area, the lesson to be learnt from the 1940s 
is not to repeat the errors of that period relating to competition policy, protectionism, and state 
ownership.   
Going back to 1950s-style competition policy through returning to a broad ‘public-interest’ rather than 
a narrow ‘competition’ basis, which is made possible by Brexit, would be a big mistake.  During the 
period when the public interest was the key criterion, in practice, competition policy was subordinate 
to industrial policy (Wilks 1999) which undermined merger control, especially.  Stronger competition 
 
19 It might be noted that the banks still enjoy a (much reduced) implicit subsidy of about £5 billon per year 
(Ramsden, 2021) while total taxes on bank profits (including the Bank Levy and Bank Surcharge) are in real 
terms no higher than in 2006/7 (ONS, 2021). 
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in product markets improved UK productivity performance in the later 20th century (Crafts, 2012) and 
after reforms around the turn of the century the competition policy framework became conducive to 
productivity growth (Buccirossi et al., 2013).20 
A return to the earlier public-interest approach as advocated, for example, by IPPR (2018), would 
inevitably mean the re-politicization of competition policy (Vickers, 2017) with adverse implications 
for productivity.  Unfortunately, this seems to be the direction in which competition policy is now 
heading. notably through the National Security and Investment Act which allows ministers to block 
mergers and takeovers in the public interest in 17 areas of the economy (Fingleton, 2018).  Moreover, 
the proposed reform to competition policy currently out for consultation foresees government 
‘strategic steers’ to ensure that the CMA supports the ‘plan for growth’ and wider economic policy 
(BEIS, 2021). 
Protectionism impaired productivity performance in the early post-war years and reductions in trade 
costs, notably through European integration, had the opposite effect in the later 20th century.  Attlee 
was a fully paid-up Eurosceptic and the Labour government took a very dim view of proposals for 
European integration as was evidenced by their refusal to participate in 1950 in the Schuman Plan for 
the European Coal and Steel Community, the precursor of the EEC (Bogdanor, 2013).  This was also a 
big mistake.  Eventually, accession to the EEC increased the level of real GDP per person by 8.6% after 
10 years according to the synthetic control estimates of Campos et al. (2019).  In the context of the 
European single market foreign entry stimulated domestic firms’ TFP growth (Aghion et al., 2004).  
Over time, EU membership very largely eliminated the subsidies which underpinned incumbent firms 
with declining productivity and slowed down the process of creative destruction in the 1970s (Oulton, 
2000). 
Unfortunately, these lessons are being disregarded and policy errors are being repeated.  A hard 
Brexit, which will raise trade costs and reduce productivity levels is in place as political ambitions 
trump economic analysis.  Industrial subsidies are on the way back albeit with some restraint from the 
Trade and Cooperation Agreement.  These will be implemented by politicians subject to toothless 
scrutiny by a Subsidy Advice Unit.  There is little doubt that subsidies, as in the past, will operate to 
slow down creative destruction (Crafts, 2022).21 
Expanding state ownership especially by re-nationalizing public utilities is popular with many voters.  
At the time of privatization, however, it was widely agreed that state ownership was a failed 
experiment (Hannah 2004) and 1940s-style nationalization is surely not a policy to be repeated.  At a 
minimum, very different methods of control would be needed to address managerial and government 
failure (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988).  A more appropriate response to scepticism about the performance 
of privatized companies is to improve regulation (Crossman et al., 2019).  For example, the design 
proposed by Helm (2019) appears to offer strong incentives to productivity improvement while 
ensuring that investment is adequate in a de-politicized setting. 
4. Conclusions 
UK economic performance after World War II looks very good at first sight, especially considering the 
starting point in 1945.  The post-war settlement delivered strong and inclusive growth, a rapid 
 
20 Key empirical papers which demonstrate the importance of competition for UK productivity performance 
include Blundell et al. (1999), Haskel (1991), and Nickell et al. (1997). 
21 During the general election campaign as reported by Payne et al. (2019), the Prime Minister’s electoral 
antennae led him to declare that he would ‘back British business by introducing a new state aid regime which 
makes it faster and easier for the government to intervene to protect jobs when an industry is in trouble’. 
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reduction in the public debt to GDP ratio, low unemployment, and expansion of the welfare state.   It 
would be wonderful if post-Covid UK could do likewise, and it might seem that there is much to learn 
and seek to emulate from the policy settings of those days. 
I have argued that this is not the case.  In many ways, the policies chosen then are either irrelevant 
for today or would be harmful.  On reflection, perhaps this is not surprising where supply-side policies 
are concerned but these comments apply equally to the Beveridge Report notwithstanding its iconic 
status in British political discourse. 
I have reviewed five aspects of post-war economic policy central to the reconstruction of the post-
Covid UK and these are the main findings. 
First, a low level of unemployment was achieved but it came at a cost in terms of impairment of 
productivity performance and the policy tools of the early post-war period do not address the issues 
of labour market adjustment that may surface in the post-Covid years. 
Second, regional disparities were less pronounced 70 years ago and, mindful of 1930s’ experience, the 
Attlee government began with a strong commitment to levelling up.  However, regional policy was 
soon discarded and policies of short-term employment creation did not deliver long-run 
improvements in productivity. 
Third, in several ways supply-side policies undermined productivity growth and the key takeaway is 
not to repeat these errors.  This applies especially to competition policy, trade policy and 
nationalization.  Lack of effective competition was the Achilles’ heel of the early post-war economy. 
Fourth, the welfare reforms of the 1940s did reduce poverty somewhat but were based on a seriously 
flawed design which mistakenly relied on flat-rate contributions and benefits but did not adequately 
address market failures through providing true social insurance.  We can surely do better. 
Fifth, the post-war approach to reducing the public debt to GDP ratio partly through financial 
repression is worth thinking about in the context of quantitative easing and a political imperative of 
‘no return to austerity’. 
Overall, we can respect the post-war determination to make the UK a fairer society, to avoid a return 
to the unemployment of the 1930s, and to reconstruct a war-damaged economy.  But we should not 
think that the economic policies of those days are a blueprint for reforming the welfare state or 
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Table 1. Macroeconomic Performance, 1950-1973. 
Unemployment (%) 2.63 
CPI Inflation (% per year) 4.70 
Labour Productivity Growth (% per year) 3.74 
 
Source: Thomas and Dimsdale (2017); Unemployment from Table A50, Column J, Inflation from 
Table 47, Column E, productivity growth based on hours worked and calculated from Table A8, 
column B and Table A54, column AW. 
 
Table 2. Living Standards, 1950 and 1973. 







1950 7114 69.0 2184 
1973 13902 72.1 1860 
 
Note: life expectancy is average of men and women. 
Sources: Thomas and Dimsdale (2017); GDP/person from Table A21, Column X, hours worked from  
Table A54, Column AW;  Life expectancy from ONS (2015). 
 
Table 3.  Fiscal Facts. 
 1938 1951 1974 
Social Expenditures (% GDP)     8.6   11.5 18.8 
    Education     2.1     3.2   5.9 
    Health     1.6     3.4   4.6 
    Social Security     4.9     4.9   8.3 
Taxes (% GDP)   21.6   33.5 33.0 
Public Debt (% GDP) 143.8 179.8 48.7 
 





Table 4.  Regional GDP/Person and Unemployment Rate, 1931-1971. 
a) GDP/Person (Great Britain = 100) 
 1931 1938 1951 1961 
London 144.2 138.1 138.6 145.3 
Rest of South East 114.0 119.5   84.8   88.1 
South East 130.3 129.5 110.6 113.4 
East Anglia   82.7   85.4   89.0   92.4 
South West   92.3   92.0   89.3   88.9 
West Midlands   95.7   93.0 104.0 104.0 
East Midlands   86.6   89.9   95.8   94.7 
Yorkshire & Humberside   86.4   82.5   97.5   94.1 
North West   88.6   86.0 104.0   95.9 
North   65.0   66.6   88.6   89.6 
Wales   81.1   70.1   84.9   90.7 
Scotland   94.2  101.1   89.3   92.4 
 
Sources: Geary and Stark (2016) (2020) 
b) Unemployment Rate (%) 
 1931 1938 1951 1961 
London 12.2   8.0   
South East 12.0   8.0 0.9 1.0 
East Anglia 12.0   8.0 0.9 1.0 
South West 14.5   8.2 1.2 1.4 
West Midlands 20.3 10.3 0.4 1.4 
East Midlands 20.3 10.3 0.7 1.0 
Yorkshire & Humberside 27.4 13.6 0.7 1.0 
North West 28.2 17.9 1.2 1.6 
North  18.4 2.2 2.5 
Wales 32.4 24.8 2.7 2.6 
Scotland 26.6 16.4 2.5 3.1 
 
Notes: East and West Midlands aggregated in 1931 and 1938, East Midlands and Yorkshire & 
Humberside aggregated in 1951 and 1961, South East and East Anglia are aggregated throughout. 





Table 5.  Estimates of Household Poverty Rates (%) 
1950 Working Class Households, York  
Actual, 1936 Rowntree Poverty Line 11.8 
With 1936 Social Security 15.5 
Without Food Subsidies 17.5 
With 1936 Social Security and Without Food Subsidies 21.2 
1953-54 All Households, UK  
   Below National Assistance Poverty Line   7.1 
   Below 60% median 13.0 
 
Notes: 1936 Rowntree poverty line is ‘human needs’ variant in prices of each year. 
Sources: Gazeley et al. (2017); Hatton and Bailey (2000). 
 
Table 6. Fiscal Sustainability Data 
 b i π g d b* 
1950-59 2.59 3.22 4.22 2.67 1.479 -5.66 
1960-70 2.10 5.03 3.67 3.26 0.882 -1.69 
 
Note: 
b* is the required primary budget surplus to GDP ratio to satisfy the condition that b = (i – π – g)d. 
Sources: 





Table 7. Comparative Productivity Performance in the Golden Age, 1950-1973 
a) Productivity Growth, 1950-73 (% per year) 
 Y/HW TFP 
France 4.83 4.02 
UK 3.74 2.44 
West Germany 5.83 4.06 
 
Note: TFP is ‘crude TFP’; the contribution of labour quality is not separately measured. 
Sources: Table 1 and the long-term productivity database for Bergeaud et al. (2016). 
b) Real GDP/Hour Worked (UK =100 in each year) 
 France West Germany 
1950 80.3 70.0 
1973 112.6 111.9 
 
Note: GDP is measured in terms of 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars. 
Sources: derived from Thomas and Dimsdale (2017) Table A8, column B and Table A54, column AW 




Table 8.  Productivity Growth in Nationalized Industries (% per year) 
 Y/L Y/L Y/L TFP TFP TFP 
 1948-58 1958-68 1970-80 1948-58 1958-68 1970-80 
Coal 0.9 4.7 -2.4   0.4 3.0 -2.2 
Electricity 4.6 8.0   3.7   3.6 3.1   2.3 
Gas 1.6 5.5   4.9   0.7 3.7   4.2 
Railways 0.3 4.3 -2.0 -0.1 2.4 -1.7 
 
Note: these four sectors contributed almost 90% of the output of nationalized industries. 




Table 9.  Indicators of Protectionism. 













1958   9.8 
 
c) Trade Costs Index 
 UK-France UK-Germany 
1929 100   99 
1938 121 122 
1950 122 142 
1960 122 115 
1970 110 105 
1980   74   66 
 
Note: trade costs include all barriers to trade (policy and non-policy) and are derived from 
estimation of a gravity equation. 
Sources: 
Part a): Kitson and Solomou (1990); Morgan and Martin (1975);  
Part b): Hemming et al. (1959);  
Part c): data underlying Jacks et al. (2011) kindly provided by Dennis Novy. 
 
 
 
